Topic: unsafe fgets() in sendmail's mail.local Description: There are 4 problems: 1. Possibility to insert LMTP commands into e-mail message 2. Possibility of deadlock between sendmail and mail.local 3. Possibility to corrupt user's mailbox 4. Possibility to change e-mail headers of the message in user's mailbox Vulnerable software: Problems 1 and 2: sendmail before 8.10.0 (8.9.3 tested), all platforms Problems 3 and 4: sendmail 8.10.0 and 8.10.1 (8.10.1 tested) under Solaris only Status: vendor contacted, problems 1 and 2 are patched in sendmail 8.10.0 Long description: Problem 1: While in LMTP mode mail.local checks input for ".\n" string to find the end of the message. Sendmail will not allow this string to pass through, but using of fgets() with buffersize 2048 allows to emulate end of the message with a string "(2047 chars).\n" The rest of the message will be treated as LMTP commands. This allows to send messages to multiple mailboxes (including private and closed ones) with any spoofed information bypassing sendmail and without any filtering, checking, logging etc. Problem 2: In the conditions of the problem 1, mail.local will return LMTP answers to sendmail. Because sendmail doesn't expects any output from mail.local at this point, replies will not be taken from I/O buffer. If extreamaly large number of LMTP commands is used in the text, or the rest of the message is just a collection of text strings (in this case mail.local will reply with a error for every string) sendmail and mail.local will be deadlocked then the buffer will be filled. This deadlock problem regardless to LMTP command execution was reported to sendmail team by Peter Jeremy and patched in 8.10.0 release. Problem 3: sendmail 8.10.0 introduces support for "Content-Length: " header for Solaris in mail.local. This header stores the size of the message and is used by mail retrieving software (f.e. qpopper) to calculate message boundary in the mailbox. If this header already exists in message it will be stripped, but because fgets() is used for parsing message it's possible to add "Content-Length: 99999999" header and comment out real "Content-Length: " causing mailbox corruption using strings "(2047 chars)\n" "Content-Length: 99999999\n" in the end of message header. Problem 4: If message body is empty and last string of the message header is "(2047 chars)Content-Length: \n" the headers of this message will be glued to the next message in mailbox, because '\n' character will be lost while stripping Content-Length.