× Few antiviral products inadequately detect 3proxy as Trojan.Daemonize, Backdoor.Daemonize, etc and many detect 3proxy as a PUA (potentially unwanted program). It may cause browser warning on download page. 3proxy is not trojan or backdoor and contains no functionality except described in documentation. Clear explanation of this fact is given, for example, in Microsoft's article.

published March, 2002
last updated December, 12 2008

Bypassing the content filtering software


There are common methods allowing to bypass almost any content filtering
software  (antiviral products, CVP firewalls, mail attachment filters,
etc). I believe multiple products are vulnerable.


I.  Bypassing  attachment  detection  or invalid detection of attachment

  1. Encoded filename or boundary  in Content-Type/Content-Disposition
  2. Multiple  filename  or  boundary  fields  in  Content-Type       /
  3. Exploitation of poisoned NULL byte
  4. Exploitation of unsafe fgets() problem
  5. MIME part inside MIME part
  6. UUENCODE problems
  7. Additional space symbol
  8. CR without LF
  9. Prohibited characters in the filename
  10.Skipped file name
  11.Endless UUEncoded messages
  12.Different filenames for Content-Type and Content-Disposition
  13.Case sensitivity of Content-Type and Content-Disposition
  14.Additional dot in filename
  15.RFC 2231 encoding for filenames
  16.Missed MIME-Version header
  17.Incomlete encoding
  18.Empty boundary
  19.Corrupted MIME
  20.MIME nesting

II. Bypassing detection of potentially dangerous content

  1. Inability to check Unicode (UCT-2, UTF-16) content
  2. Inability to check UTF-7 content
  3. Inability to check file marked as UTF-7 Content
  4. Inability to check content with short Content-Length
  5. Inability to check message/partial MIME type
  6. Inability to check chunked HTTP encoding
  7. Inability to check gzip'ed HTTP encoding
  8. Inability to check binary encoding
  9. Bypassing filters with special characters
  10.Exploitation of stream buffering
  11.Exploitation of resumed connection
  12.Content encryption
  13.Different content type detection technique
  14.META tag in document body
  15.Scripting via stylesheets
  16.8-bit to 7-bit ASCII conversion
  17.Inability to parse Halfwidth/Fullwidth Unicode characters
  18.Overlong UTF sequences
  19.Exploiting Content-Type autodetection

III. What should be done?

  1. What client software vendor should do.
  2. What server software vendors should do.
  3. What system administrators should do.
  4. What content filter developers should do.

IV. What was actually done:
   Firewalls research made by 3APA3A and offtopic in October, 2004
   E-mail gateways research made by Simon Howard in November, 2007.

I.  Bypassing  attachment  detection  or invalid detection of attachment

Imagine  administrator who set his server to strip mail attachments with
dangerous  extensions:  .exe,  .com,  .bat,  .cmd, .pif, .scr etc. No he
sure,  that  his  user can't get executable file via e-mail. He's wrong.
Because  server  and  client  software  may  use  different ways to find
attachments  and to discover the type of attachments. Also, some servers
have vulnerabilities preventing them from discovering attachments. There
are few exploitation scenarios:

 1. Encoded filename in Content-Type/Content-Disposition

 Mail software finds that MIME part is actually attachment by the 'name'
 attribute  in  Content-Type  of  'filename'  in Content-Disposition. If
 neither name nor filename attribute present most software will faild to
 find attachment.

 name and filename may contain encoded-words. Usually Content-Type looks

  Content-Type: application/binary; name="eicar.com"


 Content-Type: application/binary; name="=?us-ascii?Q?eicar=2Ecom?="

 But there are different sub-variants server software may fail to check:

 Content-Type: text/plain; name==?us-ascii?Q?eicar.com?=

               name=eicar .com
               name==?us-ascii?Q?eicar?= =?us-ascii?Q?.com?=

 in  case of names like this many programs fail to detect .com extension
 or  to  find attachment at all (please note: base64 may be used instead
 of quoted-printable).

 Another example is


 in this case encoded word is incomplete and it's not clear if it should
 or  shouldn't  be decoded from base64. It will depend on client program
 implementation. Good content filtering software should try both cases.

 Some  programs  also  rely  on  boundary  to  detect  attachments.  If
 Content-Type contains something like boundary==?koi8-r?Q?aaa?= they may
 try  to  use  boundary  "aaa"  while  most  clients  will  use  exactly

 Another  case  is  then  software  tries  to  decode  enocded word, for
 example multiple programs miss attachment if it's marked as

 Content-Type: text/plain;=?koi8-r?B?;name="eicar.exe";?=

 2. Multiple filenames/boundaries.

 Another  one  point  is  how software behaves if there multiple name or
 boundary attributes. Example:

  Content-Type: text/plain;

 Most  client  programs will use last name or boundary, but good content
 filtering  software  should  block  that  kind of messages or check all
 possible situations.

 3. Exploitation of "poisoned null byte".

 I  belive  there is not need to explain that ASCII 0 byte may be string
 terminator. NULL byte may present in data as is or may be encoded using
 base  64  or quoted printable. There is a lot of situation where server
 and  client  software may react to null byte in different way. At least
 Outlook Express treats NULL as CRLF.           

  3.1 Filename and boundary.

  There  is  no  need  to  explain  that  both name="file.txt\0.exe" and
  name="file.exe\0.txt"  may be dangerous and boundary="aaa\0bbb" may be
  treated as is or as "aaa".

  3.2 MIME header and MIME body

  Imagine there is a MIME part with

  Content-type: text/plain; name=eicar.com
  \0Any: text

  Client  software  may  think that EICAR-SIGNATURE is beginning of file
  data,  while  content  filtering  software  will  think it's a part of
  header.  Or  vice  versa.  The only good solution is do not allow NULL
  byte in headers.

 4. Exploitation of unsafe fgets() problem

 I've  used  "unsafe  fgets()"  term  some time ago regarding to mailbox
 parsing  problem  in  few  application. This is input validation bug in
 programs  processing  string  input  then  long  string  are  processed
 incorrectly   in   specific  situation.  It  has  nothing  common  with
 overflowing  some buffer. Let's review small example. Imagine next code
 looks for empty string of only '\n' to find the end of MIME headers:

  while ( fgets(buffer, BUFFERSIZE, input) ) {
   if (*buffer == '\n') header = 0;

  There  is a bug in this code. Imagine the string of exactly BUFFERSIZE
  bytes long (last byte is '\n').

  First  fgets()  call  will return BUFFERSIZE-1 characters. Second call
  will  return the string of only '\n' character. It will be incorrectly
  believed to be empty string.

  A lot of client and server software has this kind of bugs. It makes it
  possible  to fool this software to detect headers there they shouldn't
  for exampe:

   Header:(number of spaces)Content-Type: text/plain; name="eicar.exe"

  or  like  in  case of 3.2 to treat some header fields as a part of the

  5. MIME part inside MIME part

  This  bug  is  very  common  for software which strips attached files.

  Content-Type=application/exe; name="eicar.com"



  then  bbb part will be removed  aaa part will contain eicar.com

  6. UUENCODE problems

  UUENCODE  is  older  format  for file attachments that doesn't require
  MIME part. In classic case uuencoded file begins with

  begin XXX filename.ext

  (XXX - file permissions in octal encoding).

  The problem is if filename contains spaces, for example

  begin 666 eicar .com

  is  valid  filename  but  multiple  attachment  filter  fail  to check
  everything  after space.

  7. Additional space symbol

  Additional  space  symbol  at  the  end of filename or boundary may be
  treated  in  different ways by client and mail filtering software. For


  may  be treated by client software as either "aaa" or "aaa\r" and both
  cases should be checked.

  same thing is with filename in MIME or UUENCODE.

  8. CR without LF

  At  least  Outlook Express treats <CR> without <LF> as end of line. It
  makes  it  possible  to create Content-Type headers and body invisible
  for content filtering software (was reported by Valentijn Sessink)
  BTW: older versions of The Bat! crash on <CR> without <LF>, see

  9. Prohibited characters in the filename

  As it was pointed by Aidan O'Kelly <[email protected]> filename
  may contain some character MUA will strip, for example eviltrojan."e"x"e
  will be treated by Outlook Express as eviltrojan.exe. This filename may
  also be coded as base64 or quoted-printable.

  10.Skipped file name

  If file extension is not present MUA may generate file name and
  extension based on MIME type. For example if 
  Outlook express will name file like ATT00xxx.hta
  (reported by Aidan O'Kelly <[email protected]>)

  11.Endless UUEncode messages

  UUEncode part usually ends with 


  As  it  was pointed by Funk Gabor [email protected]> at least
  Outlook  Express  decodes  uuencoded  part  which  doesn't  have this
  terminators while multiple filters skips these parts.

  12. Different filenames for Content-Type and Content-Disposition

  It's possible to make different filenames for Content-Type and 
  Content-Disposition fields, for exaple

          Content-Type: text/plain;
          Content-Disposition: attachment;

  (found by eDvice Security).

  13.Case sensitivity of Content-Type and Content-Disposition

  Most MUAs ignore case of Content-Type and Content-Disposition headres
  while content filtering software may behave in different way. It makes
  it possible to bypass content-filtering software by using header like

          CONTENT-type: text/plain;

  14.Additional dot in filename

  Windows agnores additional dot in the filename. That is


  is same with


  (reported by Edvice Security Services)

 15.RFC 2231 encoding for filenames

 RFC 2231 allows next encoding chema for eicar.com:

 filename*1="eicar."; filename*2="com"

 which may not be recognized by content filter.
 (reported by David F. Skoll <[email protected]>)

 16.Missed MIME-Version header

 It was reported by Martin O'Neal from Colsaire that Clearswift MAILsweeper
 fails to check attachment if MIME part misses MIME-Version header. Content
 filter should not rely on presence of MIME-Version and even Content-Type
 but should rely on message structure.

 17.Incomlete encoding

 There may be different behavior of the target program and content-filter
 in case of incomlete encodings (for example with = sign in the middle of
 encoded stream for base64, incomlete quoted-printable numbers, incomplete
 uuencode strings, etc.

 (base64 problem reported by Ilya Teterin <[email protected]>)

 18.Empty boundary


 incorrectly parsed by multiple filters, but is correct boundary.
 (Stephane Lentz, Julian Field).

  19.Corrupted MIME

  Non-stndard characters within MIME-encoded (e.g. space characters in
  BASE64 or non-printable characters) may be differently processed by
  client application and content filter. Reported by Hendrik Weimer.

  20.MIME nesting

  Content filter may be bypassing by nesting multipart MIME parts.
  Reported by Hendrik Weimer.

II. Bypassing detection of potentially dangerous content

 There  is  a  lost of software that tries to detect and block or remove
 dangerous  file  content  (HTML  strippers,  antiviral  products, etc).
 Inability of this software to handle specific data makes it useless.

 1. Inability to check Unicode content

 Multiple products (including Internet Explorer/Outlook Express) support
 Unicode (UCT-2, UTF-16) encoding for text formats including text/html.
 Unicode text  begins  with 0xFF 0xFE bytes (little endian) or 0xFE 0xFF
 bytes (big endian) with wide (WORD) characters. Content filtering
 software may fail to strip potentially dangerous information (scripts,
 ActiveX, etc) from  Unicode  format text. For example, "<script>"
 tag in unicode will be
 {'<', 0, 's', 0, 'c', 0, 'r', 0, 'i', 0, 'p', 0, 't', 0, '>', 0}
 2. Inability to check UTF-7 content

 Almost  any  MUA/Web  client  software support UTF-7/UTF-8 encoding for
 text.  Content  filtering  software may fail to strip dangerous content
 from  UTF-7/UTF-8  encoded  data. For example <script> tag in UTF-7 may
 look like <+AHM-+AGM-+AHI-+AGk-+AHA-+AHQ->.

 3. Inability to check content marked as UTF-7/UTF-8

 If  MUA  or  Web client retrieves UTF-7/UTF-8 encoded file this file is
 decoded  for  internal  processing, but not then saved to disk. That is
 text  "<+AHM-+AGM-+AHI-+AGk-+AHA-+AHQ->"  will be used as "<script>" in
 Internet  Explorer itself, but if this text is in attached file it will
 be saved without changes.

 It  may be possible to fool software into thinking attached file should
 be decoded, while it shouldn't.

 For example,

 Content-Type: text/html;

 shouldn't  be  decoded from utf-7 before checking it's content, because
 it will be saved by Internet Explorer (or MUA) as is.

 I  believe  for  content  marked  as  utf-7/utf-8  both decoded and not
 decoded content should be checked.

 4. Inability to check content with short Content-Length

 Content filtering software may believe to Content-Length MIME field and
 skip content if Length is too short or zero (as noted by Boris

 5. Inability to check message/partial MIME type

 message/partial type allows for mailers to split one large message into
 a set of smaller ones.

 Many content filtering systems fail to defragment message and will skip
 any content inside partial fragments.
 (as reported by Aviram Jenik, Beyond Security Ltd.)

 6. Inability to check chunked HTTP encoding

 IF HTTP content filtering softare doesn't handle HTTP/1.1 chunked
 encoding it may be bypassed.
 (reported by Vincent Royer <[email protected]>)

 7. Inability to check gzip'ed HTTP encoding

 HTTP content filtering software may skip HTTP content if it's gzip'ed.
 (reported by Vincent Royer <[email protected]>)

 8. Inability to check binary encoding

 Some content-filter fail to check attachment with
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
 For example:

 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary


 (reported by [email protected]) 

 9. Bypassing filters with special characters

  There  are some characters client or server application may ignore
  silently. For example, for HTML browsers:

  0, 9, 10, 13, 173 for Opera
  13, 10, 9, 0 for Internet Explorer

  by inserting characters with this codes into document it's possible to
  hide some dangerous tags from content filter.

  Reported by ben.moeckel at online.de

  12 and potentiall another special charecters for Apache server

  by inserting soecial characters in request it maybe possible to bypass
  IPS systems (reported by H D Moore).

 10.Exploitation of stream buffering

 There is a number of products (most common are antiviruses) designed to
 scan files, but used to filter streams (for example on HTTP proxy server).
 Because of file-oriented nature of content filtering engine, it's impossible
 to implement filtering on-the fly. In many cases data is buffered and
 checked after whole document or file is downloaded. Sometimes, to prevent
 clients from timing out beginning of the stream is sent to client without
 filtering. It makes it possible to bypass checking by adding some hoax data
 to dangerous content, because there is no way for proxy server to inform HTTP
 client that partially downloaded content should be discarded.
 Examples: eSafe, KAV (for proxy servers and CVP).

 Reported by Hugo van der Kooij, 3APA3A, Kev Ford.

 11.Exploitation of resumed connection

 Multiple protocols (FTP, HTTP) allow broken connection to be resumed. If
 connection is broken by attacker in the middle of signature (for example
 in the middle of SCRIPT tag) and later resumed it can prevent content
 from being detected.

 12.Content encryption

 As it supposed to be, it may be extremaly hard to filter encrypted content
 (for example HTTPS).
 Reported by offtopic.

 13.Different content type detection technique

 A way client application detects a type of content retrieved from server is
 almost unpredictable. For example, Internet Explorer detects file type as
 GIF if (and only if) first five bytes of the file are GIF89, regardless
 of Content-Type and URL. It may lead to situation content recognized as GIF
 with content filter will be recognized as HTML with Internet Explorer.
 It's an example of very common problem.
 Examples: Outpost, Checkpoint.

 14.META tag in document body

 Internet Explorer allows META tag to be in any part of HTML content. It
 makes it possible to change Content-Type of the document.

 15.Scripting via stylesheets

 By using expression() to calculate attribute value it's possible to
 insert scripting into stylesheets.

 16.8-bit to 7-bit ASCII conversion

 Client application (e.g. Internet Explorer) may convert 8-bit text to
 7-bit text if ASCII codepage is used. It makes it possible to bypass
 content filters by using 8-bit characters with ASCII codepage set in
 MIME headers.

 reported by k.huwig at iku-ag.de.

 17.Inability to parse Halfwidth/Fullwidth Unicode characters

 Client or server application may support translation of Halfwidth/
 Fullwidth Unicode characters (unicode FF00 - FFEE), while content
 filter doesn't.

 reported by Fatih Ozavci

 18. Overlong UTF sequences

 UTF sequence of C0XX may be decoded to ASCII XX and C1XX to ASCII
 XX+0x40. E.G. '/' character may be encoded as C02F, and on some
 systems also with C0AF and C19C. UTF sequences with more then 16 bits
 are also can be decoded to valid ASCII character.

 19.Exploiting Content-Type autodetection

 Content filter andapplication canattept to autodetect Content type by
 content and detection algorythm may be different. It causes different
 set of signatures to be applied to this file.

 As a simple case, content filter may rely on Content-Type, while
 application (Internet Explorer is most known) tries to autodetect
 type of content by default.

 Or, as an example, most antiviral application will treat HTML file with
 "MZ" header as an executable, while Internet Explorer detects it's type
 as an HTML. 

 Last case reported by DATA_SNIPER.

III. What should be done?

 1. What client software vendor should do.

  Client  software behavior should be as predictive as it possible. Even
  small  problems  (like  null  bytes  and  unsafe  fgets())  should  be
  corrected.  Configuration  options  to  block  dangerous  content (for
  example   files   with   specified  extensions).  If  content  doesn't
  correspond to standards it's better to ignore content rather than make
  some intuitive decision about it. Behavior should be as close to RFC as
  it's possible. Message with RFC violation shouldn't be processed (or at
  least user should be warned).
 2. What server software vendors should do.

  Check  all  possible situations with all known client software. Report
  all  bugs  found  (even  if it doesn't seem to be security related but
  looks  like  RFC  violation)  to  vendors.  Block content that doesn't
  conform  to  RFCs. Implement all possible encodings, but do not expect
  client software to support them always.

 3. What system administrators should do.

  Never  believe  you  system  is  protected against malware. Always
  build your network having in mind possibility of intrusion. Protect:
   Your users:
    Have  a  written  instruction  and  signed  acceptable  usage policy
    agreements.  Instruct  your  users  on  how to deal with potentially
    dangerous software.
   Your applications:
    Use    application    level   antiviral   products/firewalls.  Only
    application  level  antiviral  products  (for  example antivirus for
    Outlook  or for MS Office) can block malware by it's behavior rather
    then signature. It allows to catch almost any malware.
    In addition you can protect your applications by putting potentially
    dangerous application (browsers, mail agents, etc) into separated
    network (DMZ) with terminal access to this applications.
   Your workstations:
    It's  not  enough  to  protect  servers. It's very important to also
    protect  your workstations. Even if your server software will miss a
    virus  in e-mail it may be caught on workstation than it will try to
    launch. User must have minimal permissions possible to work with this
    workstation. Limit user's permission to deny execution of files from
    temporary folders, his profile, directories with data and another
    directories user can have write access too.

 4. What content filter developers should do.

  Never try to implement "common" methods for malware content detection. Try
  to emulate behaviour of specific applications, because different applications
  have different behaviour. If possible, try to use same libraries.
  Know exactly which standards (and extensions) are supported by each client.
  Yet do not expect applications to completely follow standard - test it.

  Remove or reformat content before filtering if it violates standards. If
  there are characters, tags or something else you do not expect for this
  type of content - be paranoid and strip it (or allow this as an option).